On Saturday, a group of 20 neo-Nazis clad in red shirts and black masks targeted a drag brunch in Columbus, Ohio. The drag queen brunch held at Land-Grant Brewing Company was a fundraiser for the Kaleidoscope Youth Center (KYC), a drop-in community center for queer youth that provides community health, education and leadership programs. While the drag brunch took place inside the brewery…
Archive for category: #Antifascism #CommunityDefense #Revolution
This is the first installment of a new column by Convergence Editorial Board member Max Elbaum. It Is Happening Here will track the MAGA drive toward one-party rule based on a white Christian Nationalist agenda, and discuss strategies to block it while building independent progressive power along the way. Especially since January 6, 2021, growing numbers of people have been worrying about fascism…
In addition to convicting prominent Nazi war criminals, he crusaded for an international criminal court and for laws to end wars of aggression.
LabourStart headline – Source: CGIL
NLF Highlights for March
It‘s almost a cliché to ask if U.S. democracy is in peril, yet New Labor Forum is obliged to address this question at every opportunity. In the current issue of the journal, labor historian Joseph McCartin suggests that the fate of American democracy has always been tied closely to the strength and posture of the U.S. labor movement. The early exclusion from unions of women as well as Black, Asian and other people of color led to a willingness on labor’s part to also accept their exclusion from the political process. Much later, McCartin notes, the emergence of a diverse workforce in the public sector led to a mutually reinforcing relationship between the civil rights movement and public sector unions, enabling both to play key roles in the expansion of democracy. This, McCartin suggests, might serve as a model for the way forward. If labor does not work assertively as a democratizing force, he argues, it will face not just its own downfall but that of democracy as well.
The role of labor in shoring up our fragile democracy is the theme of Civic Engagement and Leadership Development seminars offered by the School of Urban and Labor Studies in 2023. These Saturday seminars, starting on March 11th, are free and open to the public. Seminar topics will include the 2022 midterms, which were a surprise to pollsters and others who predicted a rout for the Democratic Party. Many experts attributed the positive outcome for Democrats, in part, to grassroots organizing by social justice organizations and labor, which made a priority of registering voters and getting out the vote, focusing their efforts on communities of color, women, youth, and union members. The seminar series will closely examine electoral organizing in three states: New York, Georgia, and Michigan. Invited speakers from labor and social justice organizations will look at what kind of organizing did and did not take place; what lessons can be learned; and what ongoing challenges and opportunities exist for progressives organizing today.
Table of Contents
- U.S. Labor and the Struggle for Democracy – Joseph McCartin, New Labor Forum
- Reinventing Solidarity Episode 40 – “The South: Jim Crow and its Afterlives” a book interview with Adolph Reed Jr.
- The Battle for Voting Rights, Labor, and Electoral Power ” – Three virtual Saturday sessions: Saturday, March 11; Saturday, March 18 ; Saturday, March 25 at 10:00 AM – 12:00 PM
U.S. Labor and the Struggle for Democracy
By Joseph McCartin, New Labor Forum
From its inception, the U.S. labor movement’s fate has been intimately bound up with the fate of political democracy. That historic connection seems more true than ever at this time. From Starbucks to Amazon, from legislative victories by fast food workers in California to the AFLCIO’s creation of the new Center for Transformational Organizing, many signs indicate a labor movement stirring to life after years of false starts, retrenchment, and retreat. Yet this hopeful energy is coalescing just as political democracy in this country—as across much of the globe—faces a deepening crisis. Whether labor can rebuild its diminished strength will depend on whether or not political democracy survives its present crisis. And whether democracy survives will in turn depend heavily on whether labor steps forward to lead not only an effort to organize workers but a fight to defend and extend democracy.
Read the full article here
The post U.S. Labor and the Struggle for Democracy appeared first on New Labor Forum.
Five year analysis and reflection on antifascist organizing and community self-defense by Corvallis Antifa.
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This October, Corvallis Antifa will turn five years old. While this pales in comparison to the decades-long tenures of some other Torch Network groups like CenTex-ARA and Rose City Antifa, we recognize that we have outlasted a lot of left-wing and antifascist projects. We wanted to take a moment to reflect on some of the aspects of our organizing that have made it possible for us to stay around this long, and to share some of the lessons we have learned doing this type of work for new organizers. Before delving into our thoughts, it is important to contextualize who we are as an organization, and detail a little bit of our history.
For those who don’t know, Corvallis is a small town of about 60,000 in Oregon, located between Eugene and Salem in the southern half of the Willamette Valley, just east of the coastal city of Newport. We live and work on the ancestral land of the Ampinefu, or Mary’s River, Band of the Kalapuya tribe.
Corvallis is a reasonably liberal town, having voted 67% democrat in the most recent presidential election, with a significant history of progressive and leftist activity. Much of this organizing comes out of Oregon State University, one of the city’s largest employers, accounting for about 20% of all jobs. Corvallis has historically had thriving, left-leaning punk, noise, and art scenes for a city of it’s size. These scenes significantly intersect with the community’s student and leftist populations. The Willamette Valley has a long history of anarchist political organizing, specifically in the cities of Eugene to our south and Portland to our north. Despite this, Corvallis is surrounded on all sides by mostly smaller right-wing communities that have been havens for white nationalist and militia activity for decades. Corvallis is nearly 80% white with a small community of Mexican immigrants. The rest of the city’s racial and ethnic diversity primarily comes from the University. Due to this, Benton County, which also includes the cities of Monroe, Philomath, Adair Village, and part of Albany, has some of the highest linguistic diversity in the state, with large Arabic, Korean, Chinese, and Thai communities.
Corvallis Antifa started in the summer of 2018 in response to a significant increase in overt neo-Nazi organizing in our city. Multiple members of the Oregon Aryans were living in town, and were frequently stickering and harassing college students and left-wing events. The response from local leftist organizations was mixed and largely non-confrontational and ineffective. Even when the Nazi’s addresses and names became known, local libs and leftists were more interested in engaging the fash through the courts and cops than they were via direct action. We came together to form CVA out of a shared critique of this response. We were inspired by the work of Rose City Antifa, the Pacific Northwest Antifascist Workers Collective, and Eugene Antifa after watching them expose the Oregon Aryans network and organize effective street actions shutting down fascist mobilizations in Portland.
When we started, we didn’t have much of a blueprint for what antifascism looked like in practice. We had been to a few counter-demos in larger cities, and had read report backs on It’s Going Down, but we had no real background in the field. We embraced the DIY punk ethic, and decided to figure it out as we went. It took us a long time to get connected with more established antifascists in our region, so we didn’t have much guidance as to what to do. We started out with low-risk activities like flyering and stickering, before gradually escalating our tactics. Through persistent pressure, and external legal consequences, the local Oregon Aryans members were forced to leave Corvallis, and their ilk haven’t returned.
We eventually taught ourselves some OSINT techniques and began publishing dossiers on local and national fash. We gradually solidified relationships with crews in Portland, and with researchers around the country. However, as our focus slipped away from local organizing, we started losing members. During this time, we also had two instances where individuals were asked to leave the group due to abusive and shitty behavior. We were left with a significantly smaller and less active core of organizers, and had to rebuild the crew from the ground up. We recruited significantly, and became more active and engaged in regional organizing, specifically prioritizing working with comrades in Salem who had been hit hard by intense fascist protests.
In 2020, we were invited to join the Torch Antifa Network. In a lot of ways, our organization had shaped ourselves in the image of Torch’s
crews, so this was a tremendous honor. Joining the network helped us codify many of our existing relationships, and opened up new opportunities for collaboration, education, and comradeship. We have become significantly more connected to national level organization since joining the network, and highly recommend it to up and coming AFA crews.
We feel that as an organization, we have been effective in our goals of community defense. We have successfully quashed almost all of the fascist organizing in Corvallis, and have majorly contributed to regional, national, and international antifascist projects. Despite this success, we are also incredibly fallible, and have made a lot of mistakes we have had to recover from. We are compiling the following list of Do’s and Don’ts based on our experience as a crew and what we have seen from organizing with other organizations and individuals. We hope that these pieces of advice will help new antifascists, and give more experienced ones something to consider.
DO’s
Keep your goal in mind.
At its core, antifascism is about serving our communities. We are often the first (and often last) line of defense against white supremacy. In order to effectively engage in community defense in a way that builds real power, we must earn the trust of those we serve. Too often we’ve watched other organizations succumb to petty beefs, reckless impulse, and ultra-left infighting. These things only serve to alienate community members from the work we do. We cannot take this risk. We must act respectfully when organizing in our community. We must put real material needs over ideological pettiness and adventurist masturbation. This looks like engaging in tactics that get material results, providing accurate and accessible information to community members, and having a public means for community members to contact you. Our goal has always been community defense, and we cannot lose sight of it.
Build strong local and regional relationships.
Much has been made about the revolutionary potential (or lack thereof) of antifascism. If there is any such potential, it is in the construction and maintenance of effective networks of militant solidarity. When we show up for each other and build lasting bonds, we are exponentially more powerful than if we are a bunch of atomized individuals fighting without coordination and solidarity. Many antifascists these days exist primarily on the internet as researchers, commentators, or shitposting propagandists. While there is legitimate utility in all of these things, they do not have the same revolutionary potential and long term impact as building real and lasting regional community. This movement is bigger than any of us. When individual antifascists get knocked out of the game, the broader community must carry on with the work.
Recognize the holistic nature of the work.
Revolutionary communities cannot solely be made through militant organization. Building local power takes way more than rowdy black bloc actions and doxes. It is important for anyone doing community defense work to collaborate with and bolster other forms of local organizing. These types of organizing are not confined to militancy. Some of our most meaningful relationships have been with subcultural organizers and mutual aid groups. Both of these spaces have been explicitly targeted by fash in Corvallis, and have been places where we have been able to collaborate and build stronger ties between different groups. Many members of CVA are also active within other community contexts, some explicitly political and some not. We have found that being active in different spaces allows us to do our work more effectively, and has deepened our ties to the broader community.
Promote urban-rural solidarity.
The US is rife with political division between urban and rural communities. These tensions that are fueled by unfounded and harmful stereotypes, and genuine economic differences. Rural communities have marginalized populations that deserve to be defended just as much as those in the cities, and failing to recognize that undermines the goals of this movement. This is exceptionally true for those of us in the western United States, where population density is low and rural communities can incredibly isolated from population centers. In our experience, many regional antifascists ignore or deride rural organizing. This is actively ceding territory to the far-right. Ignoring small communities allows fascism to proliferate unchecked.
Avoid grifters, narcissists, and wannabe celebrities.
Be extremely suspicious of anyone who aims to promote themselves in antifascist circles and on the political left in general. People who attempt to use this movement for personal, social, and/or economic gain are not your friends. In antifascist circles, like all other social groups, someone who situates themself in a position of social power can use their clout to abuse and mislead others, especially folks who are younger or newer to the movement. Leftists are not immune to this phenomenon, and even if they don’t mean harm, people who care more about being the biggest voice in the room than about actually addressing a situation tend to put people in danger. We have seen this happen time and again both online and IRL. Clout is the mind-killer. Avoid it at all costs.
Learn from others but, know your own context.
Other groups have lots of experience and knowledge, but what works in one city might not work in another. Adapt tactics that you think are worthwhile, but also recognize that something that is really successful elsewhere might not do as well in your community. Use the resources available to you, and always be looking for ways to expand your knowledge and skill sets. For us, we have realized that many of the tactics effective in urban centers aren’t as effective in Corvallis.
Remember your crew is your community.
A lot of groups seem to have this idea that you don’t have to like someone to organize with them. While this can be true, it is also worth recognizing that your crew are the people you rely on. You have to trust each other in ways that maybe don’t come up in casual friendships, and you go through terrible shit together. It’s important to prioritize supporting and listening to each other. After most of our meetings and work sessions, we almost always wind up spending an hour or two bullshitting, playing games, and just being together. Moments like these remind us why we do this work, and allow us to be more effective as an organization and as people in our community.
Maintain an active core group.
It’s great to have a lot of people involved; as the saying goes, “many hands make light work.” But it’s only true if all those hands are, you know, actually doing the work. We’ve had members that needed to step back temporarily or permanently because they don’t have the time, mental capacity, or motivation to be as actively involved – and that’s okay. Check in with your crew, make sure people are okay, and remove inactive folks from the loop. It’s good security culture and better for their mental health to not be constantly bombarded by asks that they will always turn down. You can always add them back in once they’re in a place where they can be active and involved.
Respect and acknowledge a diversity of tactics.
Not every strategy is equally effective in every context, and not everyone can or wants to utilize the same tactics as you. Being preoccupied with the idea that fascist organization can *only* be countered with militancy in the streets is dangerous to yourself, your crew, your community, and ignores the vast array of tactics at our disposal. Engage in good faith with other organizers of different persuasions. More often than not, we share the same goals and are stronger together.
DON’Ts
Burnout and overwork yourself.
Whether it’s going to actions in rapid succession, overloading yourself with research, or generally exhausting yourself organizing, it can be easy to forget to take care of yourself and become overwhelmed. This is work that demands great amounts of physical and emotional time, effort, and energy. Not to mention, spending hours and hours delving into fascist spaces is never good for your mental health. Periods of rest and recovery are crucial to effective organizing, research, and militant actions.
Make it all about you.
Even when you’re sure you’re right, two-way communication with the people you’re working with is essential to effective organizing. People come from different perspectives and different life experiences, and ultimately the tactics needed are the ones that will be effective and keep (especially the most vulnerable) folks safe. For example, a cis white person might feel comfortable antagonizing the cops, but doing so causes everyone in black bloc around them to also be a prioritized target, and we know that the cis white person is not going to experience the same consequences as a trans or non-white person when arrested. We’re not going to say there’s never a reason to antagonize the cops, but make sure you think about the consequences (risk and reward) before you do so. Check your ego. It’s not about you and your ideology, it’s about keeping fascists out of our communities.
Glorify and centralize violence.
Sometimes at actions, we’ve seen people take the phrase “we go where they go” as their singular goal, and put themselves and others in dangerous situations because they didn’t take into account the real would considerations of actually fighting fascists (e.g. numbers, cameras, exit routes, weapons/protective gear, etc). The notion that effective antifascism can only be achieved through repeatedly throwing yourself into violent situations in the streets is damaging to specific actions, and undermines the safety of yourself, your crew, and your community. When you get into fights, be sure to win them. Getting beat up because you wanted to be macho and cool doesn’t help anyone and just emboldens fash. Pick fights when you have the means to win them, and use sneakier tactics when you don’t.
Be limited by ideology.
Effective antifascist organizing requires a unified front. Outright refusing to organize with antifascists who have slightly different politics than yours isolates your communities and limits your potential as organizers. We cannot afford to be separated by relatively irrelevant differences when there is urgent work to be done. Our crew has had members who have self described as Green Anarchists, Marxists, AnComs, Bookchinites, and Leninists who have been able to work together effectively because we care more about community defense and antifascism than we do about highfalutin political theory.
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The following is the transcript from Tempest’s Building the Revolutionary Left Today panel. Panelists present the questions and takeaways from their experiences in the revolutionary Left.
Luis Meiners: Building on some of the experiences and debates that we are having in Argentina, I will try to draw some conclusions that can speak to the challenges of the revolutionary Left from an international perspective. Beyond specific national situations and characteristics, which are always incredibly important, there are also many challenges that are common to a revolutionary socialist Left internationally.
First, we need to define the challenge: How do we build revolutionary organizations that are rooted in the struggles of the working class and the oppressed, and that can organize and influence these broad layers to play a decisive role in the class struggle?
In other words, how do we move from smaller propaganda groups organized around ideological coherence to organizations that can have a broader influence and impact when the situation changes internationally or nationally? How can we organize the thousands that radicalize in specific moments?
One of the challenges of the revolutionary Left is that when the situation is open to its ideas, when sections of the working class and of the mass movements have turned to the left, many of our organizations have not been up to the challenge of meeting the moment. Making the step from a propaganda group to a broader revolutionary one is a common element in all discussions regarding revolutionary organization.
In Argentina, this debate was rooted in the 2001 experience. The Argentinazo was a mass popular uprising where a broad section of the working class, the middle class, students, etc., turned to the left quite radically and quite quickly. This had different expressions.
The popular assemblies (asambleas populares) sprung up all around the country, especially in Buenos Aires, which brought people together in a direct democracy model to debate a whole range of issues in which the Left played a role. There was also the piquetero movement of unemployed workers and the student movement.
In all these movements the revolutionary Left, which was essentially composed of relatively small groups, played a role,. One of these groups was the MST, which had come from the MAS (Movimiento Al Socialismo) – the largest revolutionary party in Argentina during the 1980s which had more than 10,000 members.
Argentine savers demand their money back from the financial Corralito in front of the BankBoston headquarters in Buenos Aires, Argentina. One of the many demonstrations composing the 2001 mass uprising Argentinazo. Photo Credit: Barcex.
But a crisis in that party left behind smaller groups. So, when the Argentinazo happened, the revolutionary Left, composed of these smaller groups, were suddenly playing important roles in the class struggle. For example, the revolutionary socialist Left, the MST, and other organizations won the leadership of the main student federation in the country, the Federación Universitaria de Buenos Aires. This is a student federation that groups together 300,000 students from the biggest university in the country. The Left won decisive influence in several unions, and all of this was driven by relatively small groups.
So, the question is: When there was a mass turn to the left (and despite having managed to play a role and have electoral influence) why couldn’t the revolutionary Left emerge from that process with a mass-based party, a broad vanguard party or something similar that could bring into the organization thousands of radicalizing people?
We did emerge from the 1990s (a period extremely hostile for the revolutionary Left in Argentina and in many parts of the world) and we did grow, but we were not able to fully seize the opening provided by the Argentinazo to make a qualitative leap forward in the task of building a revolutionary organization . This outcome was one of the reasons for the re-composition of the political regime under Nestor Kirchner after the 2001 uprising.
What conclusions were debated in the MST from this experience?
One of the main issues was how to relate to broader radicalizing layers of people who are not coming from the same political background. When people radicalize, they’re not coming from Trotskyism or from revolutionary Marxism. They’re coming from very different places. Also, many people had poor experiences with Stalinist parties, and so there was a certain hostility directed toward the revolutionary Left.
Another question was on how to broaden the democratic aspects of democratic centralism in our organizations and make them as democratic as possible to be able to incorporate the radicalizing layers of people and their experiences into our organizations.
There had evolved certain defensive modes of organization… in which complete political and ideological unity was necessary before anything else. This model hampered the possibility of moving from a small propaganda organization to something that had broader political influence.
In 2006, for example, MST reformed the internal statutes of the party to try to incorporate some of these conclusions and debates. We needed to change some of the ways in which democratic centralism was put into practice. Stalinism completely distorted democratic centralism, and some of these distortions had been inherited by trotskyist currents; like the idea of needing to have absolute complete political unity, bureaucratic centralism, etc. to build organizations. This idea also related to international experiences and a period in which the revolutionary socialist Left was in a very small minority and in a very hostile environment in different parts of the world. We thought it was very important to keep the flame alive, to keep alive the ideas of revolutionary socialism against currents of socialism-from-above in its different expressions, which were on the rise.
There had evolved certain defensive modes of organization in which any small difference led to a rupture within the organizations. This led to monolithic organization in which complete political and ideological unity was necessary before anything else. This model hampered the possibility of moving from a small propaganda organization to something that had broader political influence. So, a second question really is about the need to move away from this defensive model.
The third question is internationalism, as a practical consideration, and not only as a theoretical position or a moral stance. Beyond the fundamental principle of solidarity with the oppressed and exploited people all over the world, we also have to build international organizations.
The problems that revolutionary socialists face cannot be resolved by an isolated group, we are better equipped to face them if we work together with comrades from different parts of the world. If we build international organizations, within them, we can incorporate different views from different traditions that have shaped the revolutionary socialist movement today.
Today, there is no single current within the revolutionary socialist movement internationally that can claim to have the answers to all these questions. The answers to some of these questions are going to come from the convergence of different revolutionary socialist traditions that have been built for the last 50 to 60 years.
There is a need to build broad international organizations. There is also a need to debate how we can build revolutionary organizations so that we can move away from being small propaganda groups and meet the moments of broader radicalization.
Rabab Elnaiem: I always have to start by giving glory to the Martyrs of Sudan and saying “Long Live the Struggle for the People of Sudan.” It’s exciting to be among the Left in Sudan right now. And it’s also very challenging and sometimes very frustrating.
Around 2013, we had the first wave of the revolution. Within the span of three days, we had lost around 200 people who were killed in the streets of Khartoum and other cities around Sudan. And ever since, we’ve seen different strains of a second wave of the revolution in Sudan in terms of building revolutionary organizations.
We’ve seen a lot of organizations that are made up of younger people that are trying to break away from older political parties within Sudan. This was not an initiative on the part of the new organizations. Instead, it was a reaction and an expression of frustration with the absence of a political will – seeing all the conditions of the revolution, and yet no action for revolution.
Within all of this, we’ve seen a lot of voluntary work: a lot of people trying to build more of a dual power situation, but doing so without an ideology, without a radicalized working class or radicalized everyday people. People were trying to build a substitute state by doing a lot of volunteer-NGO-type of work.
In 2018, we saw the rise of the Sudanese Professional [Nurses] Association. Their first big intervention into the public sphere in Sudan was based on a minimum wage study. Within the second wave of the revolution of December 2018, we saw the people taking to the streets demanding bread and better health services, but at the same time waiting for some type of leadership. And so, the Professional Nurses Association was basically thrown into that situation without necessarily having the right ideology or theory, and they have been trying to lead the people in the streets.
One of the first lessons that we’ve learned is that Sudan’s Professional Association is a part of the formal economy. But at the same time, large sections of the Sudanese economy is based on the informal sector, the services sector, rather than the productive sector. Sudan’s Professional Association, although they do speak for a lot of workers, they don’t have a build-up-from-below approach.
From 2013 to 2018 and up to today, we’ve seen the rise of resistance committees based on neighborhoods and workplaces. But within these are the same groups that were trying to break away from politics, as if politics or having a radical ideology or being radicalized is frowned upon. And that’s why we’ve seen the first slogan of the revolution being “Just Fall.” It does not speak of building.
What do we want after the fall of the previous regime? Do we want socialism? Do we want state capitalism? What are we trying to achieve? We’ve seen the development of slogans, but I think one of the lessons that we need to focus on right now in Sudan, and around the world, is how to radicalize everyday people.
Everyday people are already engaged with slogans, but we need to do the work of translating the slogan into a political movement with a very clear bias towards socialism, toward building institutions from below.
To go back to the statement that I started with: It is exciting to be on the Left in Sudan. It’s also the most frustrating time because there is a lot of drift, a lot of disconnect within the Left itself. There is a lot of talk of people waiting for a revolutionary party as if that revolutionary party is going to come out of nothing or just be built overnight.
Regardless of the political parties that exist right now and that are adopting the three slogans of the revolution (whether it was the first slogan of the revolution “Just Fall,” the second slogan of “Freedom, Peace and Justice”, or the “Three No’s”: no negotiation, no compromise and no legitimacy for the Army), there is a frustration and the lack of an ability to see one’s personal struggle within the bigger struggle. This creates a disconnect that doesn’t allow a lot of room for building revolutionary organizations from below.
For example, we see this a lot within the feminist agenda. We have a younger population, whose struggle is not necessarily aligned within the larger struggle. They don’t see their struggle within the broader struggle. So, we are at risk of recreating the same mistake that happened in 2013. We are in this state of trying to radicalize based on a very clear ideology but we’re trying to build so many organizations. This will create a big disconnect within the Left and lead nowhere.
Some people think we already have a revolutionary party. Some people think that this party is not revolutionary enough. But at the same time, they’re not necessarily working to radicalize the party itself or building another alternative. If one doesn’t want to work within a given party, one can build an alternative, right?
The lesson from more than three years of the Sudanese revolution is whenever we come up with a slogan which is adopted, and has a basis in daily life, we need to do the work of [realizing] those slogans. What do we mean by “freedom,” “peace,” and “justice”? What does that mean in terms of economic policies? Are we going to break away from neo-liberal policies? Will that translate into “freedom”? What is “peace”? Do we build peace from above? Or do we build it from below through the redistribution of wealth and power to different areas within Sudan?
Sudanese demonstrators with the ‘freedom train,’a Sudanese Railways train they commandeered and rode to a mass sit-in at the General Command of the Sudanese army in Khartoum. One of the demonstrations of the Sudanese revolutions. Photo Credit: Manula Amin.
What do we mean by “justice”? Is “justice” sustainable without having “peace” and “freedom”? Whenever someone is taking to the street and chanting the slogan of “Freedom, Peace, and Justice,” that person has their own radical agenda for how we are going to [move toward] “freedom,” “peace,” and “justice.”
Whenever we have that radicalization of the slogan itself by bringing it into the daily life of the people, we are closer to a dual power situation. We are technically in a dual power situation today, but at the same time, we don’t have a strong enough revolutionary organization built from below.
Andreu Coll: The main political experience I’ll explain is the building of Podemos and why and how we left that initiative when it turned to the political mainstream.
Podemos arose from a very particular political and economic situation during the crisis of 2008. There was a very severe regime crisis here in Spain. The monarchy, the main political parties, the judiciary, and the national question were all in a very big political crisis.
Podemos had two premises. One was the indignados movement in 2011, which was a radical revolt against the economic and political system which included the main parties and unions. They joined due to the passive attitudes toward the crisis on the part of the government. The other was the Syriza hypothesis. This was a new sort of independent party, non-sectarian and independent from the socialist party, that had strong links with social movements.
We were, at the time of the indignados movement, one of the currents of the Marxist Left that had an active role in that movement. Other organized currents were very critical and denounced the movement as petty-bourgeois.
In this framework, we always insisted on the need to have, in political terms, a medium-term approach of trying to transform this revolt into a concrete program and project. From this point of view, we had to fight a double illusion. When we had the rise of the movement, we had to insist on countering a movementist, anti-party illusion; in Bensaid’s words, a social illusion – to think that the movement is enough in itself as an alternative.
On the other hand, later there was the electoralist, governist, reformist, and political illusions, as Bensaid said, when we built Podemos. In some cases, the same comrades went from one side, and then to the other. We had to bend the stick on this issue too against the careerists in the movement, and later when we built the new party.
Our role was to try to build a new radical party linked to new generations. And this was a result of an agreement with Pablo Iglesias—and his very close team of comrades—and our organization at the time. Although they later presented us only having had an interest in building with them after the initiative, this was false. We were part of the building of Podemos from the start.
The main problem was that once they met with conflict with the system, with the media, with the establishment, they had a very moderate and defensive attitude. They didn’t benefit from the strong political crisis that allowed us to build an alternative common sense, breaking with all the neoliberal prejudices that were very rooted in society at the time. Unfortunately, this moderate turn towards the right allowed other parties such as Ciudadanos to tip the balance away from Podemos, emptying any critique of neoliberal order.
One of the main critiques we held at the time was this theorization of Podemos as an electoral war machine, as both [Íñigo] Errejón and Pablo Iglesias developed at the time. They also posed a false opposition between new and old politics. This was useful against the main establishment, but it was also useful to direct criticism at a more militant left that had a more democratic procedure and internal organic existence.
In the meantime, they developed this Bonapartism, one could say, which was also opposed to internal democracy and to clearer procedures such as having proportional leadership bodies, etc. And they were constantly counterposing an electoralist urgency to a patient party of building, educating, and structuring over the medium term.
From the beginning we had these two souls in Podemos (later we would have three): the Eurocommunist view of Iglesias and his team and the more populist view of Errejón.
Our main battle was always to emphasize the centrality of a new party outside of parliament as well as the task of renewing labor and social movements as a whole. This was our main approach. Our theory and aim were the need for a broad, pluralistic movement party. We were defeated maybe because we underestimated the strength of the Bonapartist role played by the central leaders and their media influence.
But the main strategic perspective for us was to have total independence from social liberal parties (mainly the PSOE – Partido Socialista Obrera de España) and a critical balance sheet of the defeat of the Syriza government in Greece. We thought that if they had been defeated in Greece with a moderate orientation, and if we were ever to have any chance of reaching power as Podemos, the reaction of the establishment, the European Union, would be even more harsh and radical against any change.
Unfortunately, the leadership of Podemos had the total opposite view: the view that Spain is far too important to be treated in the same manner as the Greek people. So, there was no critical assessment of the lessons of Greece. Unfortunately, that accelerated the adaptation of the leadership to the political regime, accepting a capitalist economy, and the EU framework.
From then on, we had to struggle, to regroup as many comrades as possible to break away because we couldn’t have any political coherence remaining inside Podemos if they joined the government, which they eventually did.
We survived because we always struggled to maintain an independent revolutionary organization with strong strategic reference points alongside the prioritization of education through our summer universities like the Socialism conference in the U.S. We were able to engage with many new activists who didn’t share our political background but were able to understand our critiques which were always concrete, offering concrete choices and orientations, and never abstract or ideological in the worst sense of the term.
Although we were defeated, Anticapitalistas is a stronger party. We have a stronger and renewed leadership that has been able to integrate the lessons from our mistakes in Podemos. We’re more strongly rooted. We have some comrades with an important mass influence even in the media, especially Miguel Urbán and Teresa Rodriguez (the mayor of Cadiz). We have the means for real electoral capability, going further than propaganda campaigns in upcoming electoral initiatives.
The main tasks today for Anticapitalistas are to improve labor militancy in new struggles and campaigns around pensions, salaries, and against inflation, and finally to relaunch our feminist and youth activity.
Natalia Tylim:I’m going to talk about the U.S. and use the experience and some of the perspectives of the Tempest Collective to inform some of my points.
In the U.S., there’s a need to reassert a baseline argument about the need for revolutionary organization and to clarify that needing revolutionary organization doesn’t mean you do that instead of the work you’re a part of in movements, in unions at the workplace, or in broader political formations. Rather, it’s a necessary precondition of the work that we do if we want broader organizing to be able to build toward a socialist project, independent class power, and an end to this world system that is driven by the imperatives of the market and is pushing humanity and the earth itself to the precipice.
This sounds like a very basic starting point, but in the last number of years in the U.S. I’ve seen how necessary it is to clarify and assert very basic principles. Horizons matter. And some of the horizons on the U.S. Left have become very limited in the last several years.
But the horizons express themselves in day-to-day political work. And we urgently need more organized democratic spaces that bring together comrades who share a general base of politics so that we can debate perspective, strategy, and tactics. This is necessary to win people to our politics, perspectives and strategies and it is the only way we can effectively be involved in this urgent, broader work that’s going on all around us. And every one of us needs to find a way to be involved in organizing. Everywhere we are, the Tempest Collective sees ourselves as a product of the weaknesses and inroads that the last generation of the revolutionary Left faced.
Horizons matter. And some of the horizons on the U.S. Left have become very limited in the last several years.
Luis spoke to a similar dynamic: the failure of smaller, revolutionary socialist organizations to relate to and be part of the radicalization. We are a product of the explosive political openings that exist in the period since the world financial crisis of 2008. This crisis is not simply a contingent set of circumstances in the United States based on who the presidential candidates were over the last two election cycles. It’s an international phenomenon.
At the founding of the Tempest Collective in the summer of 2020, most of our membership came either from the ISO, (the International Socialist Organization) which collapsed in 2019, and from the organization Solidarity.
Two years later, about half of our membership doesn’t come from either of those organizations. A lot of the newer members have politicized more recently, either through the DSA (Democratic Socialists of America), or through the George Floyd uprising and more recent touchpoints of struggle.
Those of us who come from the ISO and Solidarity have a lot to say about our experience in the revolutionary Left and the lessons and assessments we’ve taken from that. Among us there are different assessments of those experiences. It has been challenging to develop a shared assessment of what the lessons are. It has also been challenging to bring those experiences together with newer members who don’t share that same history or the same language in which older members have been trained or developed.
We’re finally beginning the process of being able to develop a more collective balance sheet of these things. We’re only at the start of this process. There is a general consensus in Tempest that whatever the factors were regarding the life (or in one case, the collapse) of our former organizations, there’s something really important that’s happening more generally (and internationally) in terms of radicalization and polarization.
Discussion of revolutionary socialist organizations was held at the Socialism Conference of 2022 in the U.S. Photo Credit: Annabella D.
We launched our website Tempestmag.org in early August of 2020. At this time, the COVID-19 pandemic had already killed 150,000 people in the U.S. The murder of George Floyd had just unleashed two months of historic multiracial, anti-racist rebellion. There were 20 million people in the streets that summer in defense of Black bodies and with openly abolitionist horizons.
We saw the natural disaster of COVID and the George Floyd rebellion as the most recent examples and expressions of this international multi-sided crisis in the U.S. These developments followed the rise of the Bernie Sanders campaign and the election of Donald Trump which were expressions of the same crises. There was the important, but episodic, rise of labor struggles with both wins and losses.
In Tempest, we didn’t see all these as U.S.-specific phenomena; they were part of an international experience that includes the debt crisis in Greece and Spain; the rebirth of reformism with a populist face like Corbyn, Melenchon, and Iglesias; the political revolutions and the subsequent reactions to them in the Middle East and North Africa; and the contradictory role of the Pink Tide governments in South America.
To understand the moment, I’ll quote from an editorial when Tempest launched:
The socialist movement in this country has not always been an outside, negligible force. For decades in the last century, it was an integral part of working class communities, politics, and struggle. It was the force which built the labor movement, which later helped, support and sustain civil rights struggles, which ensured that the New Deal concessions from the ruling class had to be made and opposed decades of bipartisan imperial policies. It was the relentless internationalism and principled opposition to all forms of oppression that made these and other victories possible. The coerced separation of our movement from our class is a wound from the middle of the last century; yet it is a live wound which makes itself felt broadly in our organizing and in our personal lives.
The editorial concluded,
If there is a single imperative which drives the Tempest project, it is not letting this opportunity be lost. The Left must lay the foundations for independent and democratic organizations of self-activity and struggle and must ensure that these organizations are deep-rooted and organically reflect and represent the working class. To do this also requires us helping re-cohere a resurgent revolutionary current.
This editorial pointed to a silver lining in a growing objective crisis we face: the growing audience for radical abolitionist, socialist, and revolutionary politics. It also points toward an issue that has followed us most of our political lives and that the Left has faced in this country for decades: the historic shortage of a class-conscious layer of fighters. Some call this the “militant minority” who can be won to socialist politics and outlooks and who would facilitate the development of a strong politically independent organization of the working class and the oppressed.
Without such a layer and without such organizations, it’s hard to imagine the type of sustained struggle that can overthrow the rule of capital. Socialists in the U.S. have not figured out how to meet the challenge of the impasse. In addition, the organizational expressions of the last generation of revolutionaries who attempted to do so have also left much to be desired.
In country after country, revolutionary organizations have split. The forces of the revolutionary Left have weakened. Organizational crises are not just about individual organizations or individual countries.
There are three things that I think are relevant lessons that require more discussion. These are issues that have often proven existential for organizations. All these underlined weaknesses in an organizational form that developed in periods of low-level defensive struggle. They hampered our ability to relate to the radicalization that was unleashed after the 2008 financial crisis. To be clear, this is not about a specific organization. Instead, these are generalizations from the revolutionary Left internationally.
First, there is a misunderstanding of the Leninist tradition, or what is meant by “Leninism.” Leninism is a rich and adaptive political tradition, but it has too often become defined as a fetishized organizational form: a bureaucratized democratic centralism. At heart, Leninism is defined by something most of us will probably find uncontroversial: that organizations should have democratic decision-making and centralized action. This notion didn’t start with Lenin. But what came to define the Leninist political tradition was a bizarre form where unity of action too often gave way to an unhealthy and uncritical unity of thinking.
Second, there has been a failure to fully grapple with and digest the dynamics around politics of gender, sexual violence, and social reproduction. Some of this consists of unresolved theoretical questions which came up during the 1970s feminist movement, but a lot of it consists of new issues that have been brought to the fore because of the ways neoliberalism produced revolutions, upheavals, and movements in response to the heightened social reproductive burden and the growth of the right.
Within our organizations, some of this crisis of sexual violence was experienced as a political opening for accountability that was never fully digested, which made it much harder to address these issues within our organizations with a common framework when they appeared. And they will continue to appear. It is not an “if” but a “when,” because they are so embedded in society. For some organizations, there’s been an effort to reject the need for a reckoning with these questions at all, seeing them as concessions to so-called “identity politics.”
Third, there’s been a failure to fully grapple with the problem of revolutionary organization, which David McNally has written about for Tempest (following Hal Draper and Duncan Hallas from earlier generations), regarding the challenges of the lack of an actual working class vanguard in all of its diversity in the United States and in much of the world. We have to start by advocating the possibility of such a vanguard instead of being able to point to what it does in its might. This is intimately tied with how we understand our goals, and how we build in a non-sectarian manner, with a modesty about what we do represents in our context as small groups of revolutionaries.
Regardless of the challenge we face of not yet having a vanguard, we need subjective revolutionaries to come together into explicitly revolutionary formations. We need revolutionaries to be organized together, not to the exclusion of the broader political work, but because of the broader political work.
Organizing with small groups of people is not the same thing as organizing in a sectarian way. On the flip side, we should not privilege small-group life over the prioritization of also building broader formations. The Left is healthier with a broad, healthy socialist milieu, and we welcome and defend that.
It’s a mistake to reject with a single stroke the broad party experiences in the U.S. DSA was an element of that broad party experience here, and we have much more to learn from other countries about this.
Organizing with small groups of people is not the same thing as organizing in a sectarian way. On the flip side, we should not privilege small-group life over the prioritization of also building broader formations. The Left is healthier with a broad, healthy socialist milieu, and we welcome and defend that.
Tempest has felt the weight of the COVID moment. For years, we’ve been limited to online forums, which are important, but which also are self-selecting and make it hard to be able to develop the type of audience that we know is out there for revolutionary politics. Moving towards more local work is where we’re starting to make inroads.
Tempest does not have it all figured out. But we believe urgently in the need to be able to address these questions and to figure them out together. We don’t think you can figure them out as individuals in the broader movement. We need more spaces like this to have these discussions and I welcome anybody who’s interested to join Tempest if this project sounds like what you’re looking for.
After canvassing, phone-banking and holding public meetings, Columbiana County, Ohio, organizers with River Valley Organizing (RVO) released a set of demands from residents of East Palestine and surrounding areas in the wake of Norfolk Southern’s train derailment disaster that led to a controlled burn of toxic chemicals and mandatory evacuations of residents within one mile of the crash site last…
On 5 March 1953, Joseph Stalin, the gravedigger of the October Revolution, died. His regime had been characterised by monstrous repression, with a river of blood separating his dictatorial rule from the genuine traditions of Bolshevism established by Lenin.
It was also a reign marked by spectacular catastrophes, such as the famine of the 1930s and the needless loss of millions of Red Army soldiers in the first stages of the war.
Stalin died in fairly suspicious circumstances. The longer he held power, the greater his paranoia grew. By the 1950s, having instigated an antisemitic campaign against mainly Jewish doctors, Stalin was preparing for another mass purge. Fearing the ramifications for themselves, and for wider Soviet society, it is believed top figures of the bureaucracy may have hastened his end.
Yet how had the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 come to this?
On this day in 1953, Joseph Stalin, the man who spearheaded the bureaucratic degeneration of the Soviet Union, died following a stroke. In this video, Alan Woods explains how Stalin came to play this ignominious role.
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— Socialist Appeal (@socialist_app) March 5, 2023
Origins of Stalinism
There is a perfidious lie that the regime of Stalin was a natural continuation of that of Lenin. This is false to the very core.
The regime established by Lenin and Trotsky was amongst the most democratic in history, basing itself as it did on the soviets. These were organs of the working class, peasants, and soldiers, which reflected the mood of the masses far more accurately than any parliament.
The soviets provided direct representation, and established the right of recall. This meant that deputies who were out of tune with the masses could be replaced. This was a far cry from the totalitarian dictatorship of Stalin.
So how was it that this brutish figure came to usurp the October Revolution and roll back many of its gains?
To understand this, we must look at the situation in which the fledgling workers’ state found itself.
From the outset, the young workers’ state faced enormous challenges. These undermined the basis for a healthy regime of workers’ democracy.
The October Revolution provoked horror and dread amongst the ruling classes of the world. Immediately, the young Soviet republic was invaded by 21 imperialist armies, who supported the efforts of the counter-revolution in Russia. This plunged the country into a bitter civil war.
The civil war – along with WW1 before it – completely shattered industry. In 1920, the production of iron ore and cast iron fell to 1.6% and 2.4% of their 1913 levels. The output of industrial commodities stood at just 12.3% of their pre-war level. Similarly, agriculture was ruined, with the 1921 harvest producing just 37.6 million tons of various crops – just 43% of the pre-war average.
Isolation and backwardness
Perhaps the most crucial consequence of the civil war was the direct impact it had on the working class. The war itself claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of workers. Many of those who survived migrated to the countryside, so desperate was the breakdown of society in the towns and cities.
By the end of the war, the working class had been decimated, and the material conditions required to maintain genuine workers’ democracy had been further eroded.
The industrial collapse undermined one of the major conquests of the October Revolution – the eight hour day. In order to produce even the most basic articles of consumption, workers had to work 10, 12, or even 14 hour days, and had to forgo their weekends.
In short, the time necessary for workers to engage in the soviets simply didn’t exist. As a result, workers’ control in society, industry, and politics was impossible.
Moreover, the historic backwardness of Russia meant most workers were illiterate, and consequently were unable to take part in the management of industry.
In all regards, a healthy regime of workers’ democracy was impossible. This was the material basis for the cancerous growth of a bureaucracy in the Soviet Union.
Even more decisive was the isolation of the revolution. Lenin and Trotsky correctly saw the October Revolution as the beginning of the world proletarian revolution. Yet tragically, the revolutions that did spring up in the years after 1917 – in Germany, Hungary, Italy, and China – were all defeated.
The responsibility for many of these defeats rests with the reformist leaders, who consciously betrayed them. Yet in a number of them, Stalin also played a decisive role, as we shall see.
As a result of the delay of the world revolution, there existed a deep contradiction within the USSR. On the one hand, the working class was incapable of running society. But on the other hand, the bourgeoisie had been defeated and capitalism had been overthrown.
It was from this vacuum that a permanent layer of functionaries emerged: the former managers and administrators of Tsarist Russia. These opportunistic, well-to-do ladies and gentlemen formed the basis of the bureaucracy. And as their weight in society increased, with the revolution isolated and the working class exhausted, Stalin would increasingly come to embody the bureaucracy’s interests.
Revolutions betrayed
The bureaucracy crystallised around Stalin in part because he was almost their living embodiment. He held a narrow, bureaucratic outlook. He was a competent organiser. And he was ruthlessly ambitious.
This bureaucratic caste was keen to maintain and increase its own power and privileges. This meant ending the upheaval of revolution, establishing order, and maintaining the status quo.
It was for this reason that Stalin would come to champion the ‘theory’ of ‘socialism in one country’, which provided a cover for abandoning socialist internationalism and the goal of world revolution.
In the eyes of the short-sighted, parochial bureaucracy, world revolution was unrealistic and undesirable. Instead, they wanted to strike deals with capitalist regimes. These careerists had what they wanted from the revolution, and wanted it to go no further.
‘Socialism in one country’, in reality, meant socialism in no country. At first, it reflected a general cynicism from Stalin that the workers couldn’t take power and transform society outside of Russia.
This was seen in his approach to the extremely favourable situation for revolution in Germany in 1923. “In my opinion, the Germans should be restrained and not spurred on,” Stalin wrote. Given the inexperience of the German communists, this advice was fatal, and the revolution was defeated.
Similarly in the Chinese Revolution of 1925-27. Stalin’s complete lack of faith in the Chinese working class led him to pursue a completely opportunist alliance with the bourgeois Guomindang party. This led to a disastrous policy of the young Chinese Communist Party subordinating itself entirely to a bourgeois nationalist party. The end result was the smashing of the Communist Party by the Guomindang and the defeat of the revolution.
Bureaucracy strengthened
These defeats of the working class internationally further demoralised and isolated workers in the Soviet Union. This, in turn, emboldened and strengthened the bureaucracy. But it was not the only layer of Soviet society that was encouraged by these reversals of the world revolution.
In 1921, the Bolsheviks had been forced by the isolation of the revolution to adopt the New Economic Policy (NEP). This meant reintroducing market relations in the countryside, in order to incentivise peasant proprietors to produce more food.
The problem was that the policy disproportionately benefited the kulaks – the rich peasants. They had larger landholdings, which allowed them to produce agricultural goods more efficiently. This meant that they could profit more from selling their surpluses.
The trade between peasants and the cities, in turn, was facilitated by so-called NEPmen – a class of petty merchants and speculators who spied an opportunity to make a quick buck.
These layers were naturally hostile to Soviet power, and sought the restoration of capitalism.
Trotsky and the Left Opposition had consistently warned against this threat. Stalin, meanwhile, leaning on Bukharin’s Right Opposition, had encouraged the kulaks to ‘get rich’, in order to develop the economy.
The ramifications of this policy came to the surface by around 1927. The kulaks began to withhold grain, and the threat of starvation in the cities loomed once more. And Stalin, the crude empiricist that he was, suddenly made an about face in 1929 – breaking with Bukharin and calling instead for the liquidation of the kulaks as a class.
Stalin began to adopt huge swathes of the Left Opposition’s programme. But did so in a crude, distorted, caricatured manner. This created huge problems.
Industrialisation was massively accelerated, to the point of adventurism. Infamously, Stalin even called for the first five-year plan to be completed in four years. Crucially, these measures were combined with the most brutal suppression of the Left Opposition itself.
Trotsky and the Left Opposition were the proletarian vanguard. But this proletariat had been drained by events. In a physical sense, they’d been devastated by war. In 1917, there were 3,000,000 industrial workers in Russia. By 1920, this figure had fallen to 1,240,000. Politically, meanwhile, workers had witnessed defeat after defeat on the international plane.
The clash between Stalin and Trotsky was ultimately a struggle of living social forces. The exhaustion of the working class thus enabled Stalin to exile Trotsky to Alma Ata in the Kazakh Soviet Republic, before exiling him from the USSR altogether in 1929.
Alongside this, there was a wave of expulsions of anyone hostile to Stalin’s policies. His grip on power – reflecting the strengthening of the bureaucracy – became absolute. As Trotsky put it:
“In its struggle against the Left Opposition, the bureaucracy undoubtedly was dragging behind it a heavy tail in the shape of Nepmen and kulaks. But on the morrow this tail would strike a blow at the head, that is, at the ruling bureaucracy…As early as 1927, the kulaks struck a blow at the bureaucracy, by refusing to supply it with bread.”
This crisis accelerated Stalin’s Bonapartist grip. The bureaucracy was petrified that it could be overthrown from the left or the right. In Stalin, this bureaucratic caste saw a strongman who could defend their privileged position from these acute threats.
Stalin’s purges
Many a sneering liberal has tried to claim that socialism inevitably leads to the kind of bloodletting and horrors that Stalin oversaw. Yet this entirely misunderstands who this violence was directed at, and for what reason.
The chief target of Stalin’s purges were the Old Bolsheviks themselves – anyone who had a connection with the October Revolution.
So it was that, of the Bolshevik Central Committee that led the working class to power in 1917, only Stalin and Kollontai were still alive by 1940. Most were murdered by the GPU (the Soviet Union’s secret services) at Stalin’s behest. Even the total capitulation of figures like Kamanev, Zinoviev, and Radek did not save them.
True enough, many of the victims of the purges were bureaucrats themselves. Does this suggest that, in a hamfisted way, Stalin was striving to defend workers against the bureaucracy?
In reality, layers of the bureaucracy were targeted for the same reason that a doctor might recommend an amputation: to cut off the part to save the whole.
Stalin leaned on the workers to strike blows against the most rotten elements of the bureaucracy: those whose voracious greed threatened to stir the workers and topple the entire edifice; those whose ambition represented a threat to Stalin’s position and to the bureaucratic machine as a whole.
So it was that over a million perished – not to establish socialism, but to preserve the rule of a parasitic caste of functionaries.
Thermidorian reaction
The purges were a culmination of what Trotsky characterised as the ‘Thermidorian reaction’ in the USSR.
Basing his analysis on the analogy of the French Revolution, Trotsky concluded that what had occurred in the Soviet Union was a political counter-revolution from within.
Having overturned the old order in October 1917, the working class had subsequently lost political power. Nevertheless, the social conquest of the revolution – the nationalised planned economy – remained.
This was comparable to the process of the French Revolution. Robespierre’s Jacobin faction, the most revolutionary section of the movement, was deposed by more conservative elements from within the revolution.
Eventually Napoleon Bonaparte seized power. In 1804, he proclaimed himself Emperor, undoing the political gains of the republic. Yet Napoleon did not restore feudalism in France. Instead, he based his regime on the new capitalist relations that had been established by the revolution.
Similarly in the USSR, Stalin based himself on the nationalised planned economy. Representing the bureaucracy, however, he had politically usurped the working class. Socialist property relations remained, but many of the gains of the revolution were rolled back.
The most obvious expression of this was the complete annihilation of workers’ democracy inside the Soviet Union, in favour of the rule of the bureaucracy, alongside the counter-revolutionary role played by Stalinism internationally.
Zigzags and catastrophes
Stalin never really grasped the Marxist method. Indeed, the Old Bolshevik Yeveny Frolov claimed that “Stalin struggled to understand philosophical questions, without success”. Instead of applying dialectical materialism to problems, he adopted a crude empiricism approach – with disastrous consequences.
This first manifested itself with Stalin’s adherence to the New Economic Policy. He viewed its relative success – in comparison to the previous period of ‘war communism’ – as proof that there was no need for a change of course.
Neglecting to analyse the NEP in an all-sided manner, such as its impact on class formations, he failed to see the latent political danger that it carried: strengthening market relations and emboldening the kulaks and petty traders.
Empirically, Stalin later drew the conclusion that private capital accumulation in agriculture was not the way forward. Consequently, he did a volte-face, launching a campaign to forcibly collectivise agriculture and liquidate the kulaks as a class.
No consideration was given to whether collectivisation was possible; whether the country’s industry could furnish peasants with the machinery and resources required to make collective farming successful.
As a result, the policy led to a total and utter catastrophe in agriculture, provoking a famine that killed millions, and leaving a lasting scar in the countryside.
‘De-Stalinisation’
Stalinism can be defined as the bureaucratic (mis)management of the planned economy. From this flows the political dictatorship required to protect the power and privileges of the bureaucratic caste. But did this system die with its boss?
In his ‘Secret Speech’ in 1956, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev attempted to pin the blame for all the horrors and catastrophes of the preceding decades onto Stalin and his ‘cult of personality’.
Stalin had placed emphasis on developing heavy industry at a blistering pace, at the expense of consumer goods and housing. This meant that living standards were still much lower in the USSR than in the West.
By the 1950s, this was preparing a social explosion, particularly as the bureaucracy furnished itself with limousines and dachas. According to historian Roy Medvedev, wage differentials between top bureaucrats and workers stretched to as much as 100-to-1.
Under Khrushchev, therefore, economic concessions were granted from above in order to prevent political revolution from below.
Between 1955-58, the average factory wage was raised from 715 roubles a month to 778. Meanwhile, official prices remained fixed, and some were even cut. Shorter hours were introduced for young workers, without a loss of pay, alongside longer holidays.
Given the decades of accumulated discontent, particularly in the satellite states of Eastern Europe, it did not take long for these concessions to encourage a movement from below.
As French political philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville perceptively noted: “The most dangerous moment for a bad government is generally that in which it sets about reform.” And so it was for the Soviet bureaucracy.
In October 1956, revolution broke out in Hungary. Workers and students were resentful of totalitarian rule, Soviet domination, and the deteriorating living standards that flowed from this. Indeed, disposable income for Hungarian workers in 1956 was two-thirds of what it had been in 1938 – a consequence of the Soviet Union draining the country through post-war reparations.
Contrary to the claims of the Stalinists, however, this was no counter-revolution. The manifesto under which the revolution was fought was issued by Péter Veres, the president of the Writers’ Union. The second demand of this read:
“The social and economic system of Hungary should be socialism built up by democratic means in accordance with our national characteristics. The 1945 agricultural reform and the public ownership of factories, great industrial enterprises, mines and banks, have to be maintained.”
Even more instructively, the revolution saw the formation of democratic workers’ councils – i.e. soviets. Yet what was the response of Khrushchev and co? It was to send in the tanks and brutally repress the Hungarian Revolution.
As Ted Grant put it at the time: “If the Kadar government really represented the masses and not the counter-revolution in Stalinist form, it would have based itself on the soviets or workers’ committees, as Lenin did in 1917.”
Stalin’s legacy
Stalin’s death, therefore, heralded no qualitative change. Stalinism remained in place, with tragic consequences for the working class, in Russia and internationally.
The bureaucratic monolith, which Stalin had stood at the head of, eventually came crashing down in 1991 – just as Trotsky had predicted in his masterpiece Revolution Betrayed.
This was Stalin’s real lasting legacy: to pave the way for capitalist restoration in the land of the October Revolution.
In marking the anniversary of his death, our role – as the philosopher Spizona once stated – is neither to weep nor to laugh, but to understand.
Today, disgusted by capitalism, a new generation is turning towards communism. Our task is to organise and educate these class fighters in the genuine ideas of Marxism, and to prepare for the revolutionary upheavals that impend.
Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene, whose conspiratorial record spans QAnon and Jewish Space lasers to helping incite the January 6 attack on the Capitol, wants the government to recognize anti-fascists as terrorists.
Yes, in Greene’s mind: to be the opposite of a terrorist, to be a citizen in good standing, you’d have to be consequently the opposite of an anti-fascist.
On Sunday, videos circulated online showing what appeared to be construction equipment meant for Atlanta’s planned “Public Safety Training Center” (or as non-officers call it, “Cop City”) on fire, after reported clashes between protestors and the police. Greene reacted to the videos, calling it “domestic terrorism,” and announcing her intentions to lead a resolution to declare Antifa as a “terrorist organization” on Tuesday.
Atlanta’s police training center has been met with opposition since its approval in 2021, just shortly after the Black Lives Matters protests against police brutality that swept the country. Swaths of people, from environmental organizations and forest defenders to neighborhood associations and local schools, have come out strongly against the $90 million project. The proposal includes a shooting range and mock village, which earned it the nickname “Cop City.”
The proposed location for police training center is an abandoned prison complex in the South River Forest; the old complex, the Old Atlanta Prison Farm, was allegedly host to “systemic abuse, torture, overcrowding, neglect, and racialized violence” throughout its history, and there is suspicion that “unmarked graves of prisoners exist on the grounds.”
The project has spurred all the more scrutiny after police in January shot and killed environmental activist Manuel Esteban Paez Terán, also known as Tortuguita, during a police raid of an encampment on site. Police say that Tortuguita shot at them, which prompted them to fire back. An officer was in fact hospitalized after being shot in the abdomen—but protestors contested the police’s claim and bodycam footage later revealed a cop saying, “You fucked your own officer up.” After initially claiming that no footage of the shooting existed, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation had admitted five days later that footage of the shooting’s aftermath did exist.
In the footage, about 14 seconds of continuous gunfire can be heard, not a back-and-forth exchange of gunfire between Tortuguita and the police. Shortly after, a person is heard asking “Is this target practice?”
This is the context in which Greene groups all those opposed to the bloated police project (environmentalists, students and teachers, everyday residents of the city) under the blanket term “Antifa,” and then calls for them to be labeled “domestic terrorists.” The always-suspicious Greene has expressed no skepticism about the police’s account of what some may deem state-sanctioned murder, but of course had plenty to say about burning construction equipment.
Bear in mind that while Greene calls for a “national divorce,” and wants the government to recognize people opposed to fascism as “terrorists,” Republican leader Kevin McCarthy has said he will “never leave” and “always take care of” Greene.